

Summary Report

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Executive summary

Atlassian engaged Bugcrowd, Inc. to launch and implement a Security Program comprising one or more engagements on the Bugcrowd Platform.

The testing type, scope, targets, and duration of the testing done for each engagement were specified in the Engagement Brief that was created during planning.

During testing, each discovered vulnerability was validated and assigned a priority level for remediation. The complete list of vulnerabilities uncovered during the engagement(s), along with their potential impact, is shown in the Findings section.

This report shows testing for Atlassian's targets during the period between 07/01/2024 – 09/30/2024.

For this Security Program comprising one or more engagements, submissions were received from **201** unique testers.

The continuation of this document summarizes the findings, analysis, and recommendations from the engagement(s) performed by Bugcrowd for {org-name}.

This report is a summary of the information available. All details of the engagement's findings — comments, code, and any tester provided remediation information — can be found in the <u>Bugcrowd platform</u> (https://tracker.bugcrowd.com)




Reporting and methodology

Background

The strength of crowdsourced testing lies in multiple researchers, the pay-for-results model, and the varied methodologies that the researchers implement. To this end, researchers are encouraged to use their own individual methodologies on various Engagements.

The workflow of every Bugcrowd Security Program Engagement can be divided into the following four phases:



Depending on the type of engagement, testers may have adopted one or more methodologies to guide their testing, including:





Engagement details

This report incorporates following engagements within the Atlassian Security Program as an aggregate:

Atlassian

Targets and scope

Bugcrowd worked with **Atlassian** to define the Rules of Engagement, targets, duration, and scope for each engagement prior to launch. The following targets were considered explicitly in scope for testing:

- Jira Cloud Mobile App for Android
- Jira Cloud Mobile App for iOS
- Atlassian Admin (https://admin.atlassian.com/)
- Atlassian Start (https://start.atlassian.com)
- Jira Software Cloud (bugbounty-test-<bugcrowd-name>.atlassian.net)
- Jira Service Management Cloud (bugbounty-test-<bugcrowd-name>.atlassian.net)
- Confluence Cloud Premium (bugbounty-test-<bugcrowd-name>.atlassian.net/wiki)
- Bitbucket Cloud including Bitbucket Pipelines (https://bitbucket.org)
- Jira Work Management Cloud formerly Jira Core (bugbounty-test-<bugcrowd-name>.atlassian.net)
- Confluence Cloud Mobile App for iOS
- Atlassian Access (https://admin.atlassian.com/atlassian-access)
- Confluence Cloud Mobile App for Android
- Atlassian Identity (https://id.atlassian.com/login)
- Any associated *.atlassian.com or *.atl-paas.net domain that can be exploited DIRECTLY from the *.atlassian.net instance
- Confluence Cloud (bugbounty-test-<bugcrowd-name>.atlassian.net/wiki)
- Jira Software Data Center
- Atlassian Atlas
- Atlassian Marketplace (https://marketplace.atlassian.com)
- Bitbucket Data Center
- Jira Core Data Center
- Crowd
- Atlassian Compass
- Confluence Data Center
- *.atlastunnel.com
- Jira Service Management Data Center




- Any other *.atlassian.com or *.atl-paas.net domain that cannot be exploited directly from a *.atlassian.net instance
- Rovo
- Jira Product Discovery
- Confluence Companion App for macOS and Windows
- FishEye
- Sourcetree for macOS and Windows (https://www.sourcetreeapp.com/)
- Jira Data Center Mobile App for Android
- Confluence Data Center Mobile App for Android
- Bamboo
- Other (all other Atlassian targets)
- Confluence Data Center Mobile App for iOS
- Jira Data Center Mobile App for iOS
- Crucible
- https://www.npmjs.com/package/@forge/cli
- GraphQL API (bugbounty-test-<bugcrowd-name>.atlassian.net/gateway/api/graphql)
- Forge Platform

All details including the scope can be reviewed in the settings of each engagement.



Findings Summary

The following chart shows all valid assessment findings from the engagement by technical severity.





Risk and priority key

The following key is used to explain how Bugcrowd rates valid vulnerability submissions and their technical severity. As a trusted advisor Bugcrowd also provides common "next steps" for program owners per severity category.

Technical severity	Example vulnerability types
Critical P1 Critical severity submissions (also known as "P1" or "Priority 1") are submissions that are escalated to Bugcrowd as soon as they are validated. These issues warrant the highest security consideration and should be addressed immediately. Commonly, submissions marked as Critical can cause financial theft, unavailability of services, large-scale account compromise, etc.	 Remote Code Execution Vertical Authentication Bypass XML External Entities Injection SQL Injection Insecure Direct Object Reference for a critical function
Severe P2 High severity submissions (also known as "P2" or "Priority 2") are vulnerability submissions that should be slated for fix in the very near future. These issues still warrant prudent consideration but are often not availability or "breach level" submissions. Commonly, submissions marked as High can cause account compromise (with user interaction), sensitive information leakage, etc.	 Lateral authentication bypass Stored Cross-Site Scripting Cross-Site Request Forgery for a critical function Insecure Direct Object Reference for an important function Internal Server-Side Request Forgery
Moderate P3 Medium severity submissions (also known as "P3" or "Priority 3") are vulnerability submissions that should be slated for fix in the major release cycle. These vulnerabilities can commonly impact single users but require user interaction to trigger or only disclose moderately sensitive information.	 Reflected Cross-Site Scripting with limited impact Cross-Site Request Forgery for an important function Insecure Direct Object Reference for an unimportant function
Low P4 Low severity submissions (also known as "P4" or "Priority 4") are vulnerability submissions that should be considered for fix within the next six months. These vulnerabilities represent the least danger to confidentiality, integrity, and availability.	 Cross-Site Scripting with limited impact Cross-Site Request Forgery for an unimportant function External Server-Side Request Forgery
Informational P5 Informational submissions (also known as "P5" or "Priority 5") are vulnerability submissions that are valid but out-of-scope or are "won't fix" issues, such as best practices.	Lack of code obfuscationAutocomplete enabledNon-exploitable SSL issues

VRT

Bugcrowd's Vulnerability Rating Taxonomy

More detailed information regarding our vulnerability classification can be found at: https://bugcrowd.com/vulnerability-rating-taxonomy




Appendix

Included in this appendix are auxiliary metrics and insights into the engagement(s). This includes information regarding submissions over time, payouts and prevalent issue types.


Submissions over time

The timeline below shows submissions received and validated by the Bugcrowd team:



Submissions signal


A total of **439** submissions were received, with **102** unique valid issues discovered. Bugcrowd identified **32** informational submissions, **64** duplicate submissions, removed **273** invalid submissions, and is processing **0** submissions. The ratio of unique valid submissions to noise was **23%**.





Bug types overview

This distribution across bug types for the engagement(s) only includes unique and valid submissions.



Average On-Demand Program





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Closing Statement

Introduction

This report shows testing of Atlassian between the dates of **07/01/2024 and 09/30/2024**. During this time, **201** testers from Bugcrowd submitted a total of **439** vulnerability submissions against Atlassian's targets. The purpose of this testing was to identify security issues that could adversely affect the integrity of Atlassian. Testing focused on the following:

Engagements overview

It is important to note that this document represents a point-in-time evaluation of security posture. Security threats and attacker techniques evolve rapidly, and the results of this assessment are not intended to represent an endorsement of the adequacy of current security measures against future threats. This document contains information in summary form and is therefore intended for general guidance only; it is not intended as a substitute for detailed research or the exercise of professional judgment. The information presented here should not be construed as professional advice or service.

Testing Methods

This engagement(s) selected and activated testers who that used a combination of proprietary, public, automated, and manual test techniques throughout the assessment. Commonly tested vulnerabilities include code injection, cross-site request forgery, cross-site scripting, insecure storage of sensitive data, authorization/authentication vulnerabilities, business logic vulnerabilities, and more.



During the Engagement, Bugcrowd discovered the following:

Technical Severity	Count
Critical vulnerability	1
Severe vulnerabilities	7
Moderate vulnerabilities	43
Low vulnerabilities	21
Informational vulnerabilities	30